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Disaster risk governance is concerned with how institutions change in response to perturbations or, conversely, are
able to remain static for long periods of time. In Montserrat, the volcanic eruption in 1995 produced
unprecedented challenges for both local government authorities and the UK Government. The sharp and sustained
rise in the level of volcanic risk combined with an inadequate response from UK and local authorities prompted a
shift in governance arrangements, and when levels of risk declined these new configurations did not go back to
their pre-crisis state.
This paper focuses on one aspect of this governance transition: the relationship between the local Montserratian
government and the UK government. Before the eruption Montserrat enjoyed high levels of political and fiscal
independence from the UK in disaster risk management and other investment decisions, but the volcanic crisis
highlighted low levels of capacity and the inherent instability in this system. A new co-governance regime was
established after the crisis, characterised by greater UK intervention in local investment decisions and some loss of
political sovereignty. On the other hand, Montserrat has become more integrated in regional and international
disaster risk governance systems, and today the division of local and central responsibilities for different aspects of
disaster risk management is much clearer than before the volcanic crisis.
This paper demonstrates how disasters can create spaces for existing risk governance systems to be questioned
and modified. The volcanic crisis led to a reconsideration of responsibilities and risk management practices by both
Montserratian and UK authorities, and initiated a process of transformation in land-use and development planning
that has substantially reduced levels of volcanic risk on the island. However, these benefits have to be weighed
against loss of livelihoods for a significant proportion of the population and considerable social upheaval.
Critical to the success of this new development model is the need for vertical coherence and dialogue between
different stakeholders. Montserrat and UK risk governance systems are more integrated now, but unless
communities are engaged in risk management decisions, Montserrat's low- risk development model could come
unstuck. Small islands with large risks can learn a lot from the Montserrat experience.
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A disaster risk governance system comprises a complex
web of actors and networks involved in formulating
and implementing polices to manage disaster risk, ins-
titutional arrangements that determine the relationships,
roles and responsibilities of these actors, coordinating
mechanisms and political culture, including different per-
ceptions of risk (Renn 2008; Wilkinson 2013). The sys-
tem is therefore characterised by a number of elementsCorrespondence: e.wilkinson@odi.org.uk
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in any medium, provided the original work is pof interaction such as stakeholder participation in policies
to reduce risk (Pelling 2011).
This paper is concerned with multiple levels of risk gov-
ernance and (a) whether crisis leads to changes in the sys-
tem; (b) the nature of the shift (key aspects of the system
that are altered); and (c) the change process. This is
assessed in the context of Montserrat in the British West
Indies, where a long-duration volcanic crisis in the 1990s
highlighted internal contradictions inherent in the broader
system of governance. Other volcanic eruptions in the
eastern Caribbean have resulted in greater loss of life than
the 1995–1997 eruption of Soufrière Hills Volcano–mostOpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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which killed 29,000 people (Tanguy 1994) – but the
Montserrat volcanic crisis has attracted special interest
from natural and social scientists alike because of the un-
predictable and incremental escalation of volcanic activity,
coupled with vulnerability and exposure characteristics
found only on small islands.
A series of forced evacuations and delineation of risk
zones in Montserrat avoided the mass casualties of
Martinique, but on 25 June 1997, 19 people returning to
the exclusion zone were killed by pyroclastic flows (see
Figure 1). Two months later pyroclastic flows engulfed
the capital, Plymouth, putting an end to discussions on
whether the port and other major facilities could be used
for the foreseeable future. Before these tragic events the
Government of Montserrat and the UK Government
had been struggling to manage a crisis for which they
were relatively unprepared and when rehabilitation and
reconstruction began, they continued to face difficulties
and public criticism.
The purpose of this paper is not to provide a summary
of events, or attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of col-
lective responses to the volcanic crisis. NumerousFigure 1 Map of Montserrat. Katy Mee, British Geological Survey.reports and papers have been commissioned and written
on the events and decisions taken by UK and
Montserrat authorities, each presenting a view of what
went wrong (see, for example, Clay et al. 1999; Donovan
et al. 2012; Kokelaar 2002). More recently, studies have
focussed on post-disaster reconstruction and the UK
government’s performance in promoting long-term de-
velopment on the island (ICAI 2013; Sword-Daniels et
al. 2013). Rather, the paper takes a longer term view of
changes in disaster risk governance, analysing the crit-
ical shifts that occurred in response to an extreme
event, as well as the change processes themselves (for a
summary of key disaster risk governance events see
Additional file 1).
Conceptual framework
Concepts of ‘systems’ and ‘scale’ are used to study
the nature of changes in response to perturbations.
These draw on the socio-economic systems, resilience
and natural resource governance literature. ‘Scale’ is
defined as the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analyt-
ical dimensions used to measure and study any
phenomenon (Gibson et al. 2000). This paper focusses
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vided into different bounded and organised political
units, with linkages between them; and the temporal
scale, which can be divided into different ‘time frames’
related to rates, durations, or frequencies (Ostrom et al.
1999). Effective disaster risk management (DRM) depends
on the cooperation of international, national, regional and
local institutions across temporal and jurisdictional and
geographical scales, so understanding these interactions is
critical.
Within the jurisdictional scale, the vertical power rela-
tionships between local and central political units are of
particular interest. Building on work by Claudia Pahl-Wostl
(2009) on multi-level learning processes and adaptation,
two key aspects of vertical governance dialectics can be
identified: (a) dispersion of decision-making authority and
(b) vertical coherence.
(a)The dispersion of decision-making authority refers
to the authority of different centres of decision
making that are formally independent of each other
(Ostrom, 1997; McGinnis 2000; Heinelt 2002). Local
governments are thought to require autonomy from
higher levels of government so that they can define
their own priorities and implement DRM measures
without too much interference, and thus gain
credibility and trust from their citizens; both of which
have proven critical for disaster risk management
(Wilkinson 2012). However, this kind of autonomous,
inclusive style of governance is not the modus
operandi of most local governments. This paper
focusses on the political and fiscal autonomy of the
Montserrat government to develop its own risk
management policies, as well as its capacity to do so.
It discusses the evolution of co-governance
arrangements through which UK authorities and the
Montserrat government jointly make decisions to
manage exposure to volcanic risk.
(b)Vertical coherence is concerned with the division of
roles and responsibilities for risk management
between different political units, from local
government to tiers higher up the scale – including
provincial governments (or states in federal systems
of governance), national government and regional
authorities like the European Union (EU).
Incoherence in service delivery often occurs because
of poorly defined and overlapping mandates
(resulting in omission and/ or replication in service
delivery), overly complex structures (Pahl-Wostl
2009), capacity constraints and unfunded mandates
(Posner 1998), as well as centrist and paternalistic
tendencies in public administration systems
(Wilkinson 2012); all of which can constrain
progress on managing disaster risk. Hence, analignment of interests between governance scales can
help to promote more effective DRM. This includes
not only the participation of actors from one level in
decision-making processes at another but also
institutions and knowledge produced at one level
influencing processes at another (Pahl-Wostl 2009).
Particularly critical for DRM is the alignment of risk per-
ceptions across scales of governance through bi-directional
process (Slovic 1987). Different people and cultures re-
spond to disaster risk differently (Gaillard 2008; Heijmans
2001; Paton et al. 2001; Paton et al. 2010), and in the con-
text of volcanic hazards, proximity to the hazard (Gregg et
al. 2004), living memory of an eruption and level of impact
(Paton et al. 2001) all shape risk perceptions amongst indi-
viduals and groups. Even if risk perception is high, people
may still put concerns about convenience and living costs
ahead of their desire to lessen their exposure (Gaillard
2008). This suggests that the idea of an acceptable level of
risk is inappropriate. Rather, people do not accept risks but
tolerate them to secure certain benefits (Pidgeon et al.
1992; Simmons and Walker 1999). The values underlying
any notion of tolerable risk may not be shared by everyone;
in fact much research on risk analysis and societal reac-
tions to different threats highlights the differences between
institutional responses such as regulation and public re-
sponses (Barnes 2002). In particular, disaster events can re-
sult in the creation of new official rules to control risk that
minimise exposure - for example through the creation of
exclusion zones and resettlement policies - but these
values may not be shared by those that live in exposed
areas and whom are to be resettled. Dialogue and ne-
gotiation between authorities and communities is
therefore required to reach more sustainable solutions
(Haynes et al. 2008).
The analysis of the disaster risk governance system in
this paper draws heavily on resilience thinking, and in
particular resilience frameworks that emphasise the cap-
acity of a system to respond to shocks and stresses in
different ways – such as by coping, adapting and trans-
forming (Bené et al. 2012; Cutter et al. 2008; Pelling
2011). Disaster risk governance systems are highly sensi-
tive to rates, durations and frequencies of disaster events
and changes in the system often occur as a result of
these events as well as in response to other external
pressures. The feedback processes are however non-
linear and unpredictable (Ramalingam et al. 2008).
Notwithstanding their idiosyncrasies, volcanic erup-
tions can be characterised in terms of their spatial and
temporal dimensions: they are often slow onset and long
duration event that allow for changes in policy and be-
haviour while the event is still unfolding. It is usually
possible to identify sharp increases in the level of risk,
resulting in crisis period(s) for affected populations and
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considered to have three temporal phases within which
feedback processes occur, with accompanying options
for institutional learning and collective action:
(i.) Pre-crisis period, in which action may be taken to
mitigate existing and anticipate future risk, such as
land-use planning, retrofitting roofs, the development
and enforcement of building codes, education and
training programmes. Land-use planning is a
prospective tool that can be used to prevent or limit
construction in unsafe areas, while relocation and
re-zoning of space is a corrective tool to reduce
existing exposure to hazards. Education related to
building practices that reduce ash entry into homes is
a risk management activity that anticipates and
reduces risk in the future, while training on early
warning systems manages current levels of risk by
encouraging evacuations and reducing loss of life.
(ii.) Crisis period, which we can sub-divide into: a) start of
the eruption and potentially long period of unrest
(often characterised by seismic activity), which can be
treated as a preparedness phase; and b) heightening of
the crisis, usually initiated by an eruption, prompting
emergency response activities to reduce negative
impacts on people, such as food aid and shelter
provision. These sub-phases vary widely across
settings however and some volcanoes may do
(a) and not (b), while some have (b) with no (a).
(iii.) Post-crisis period, characterised by short- and
longer-term recovery measures (the first of which
may commence during the crisis period) to restore
livelihoods and infrastructure as well as control
future risk and promote sustainability (Alexander
2002; Tierney 2012). These corrective and prospective
risk reduction measures are more likely to occur in
the post-crisis period than before an event has
occurred as disasters highlight previous failures and
can act as catalysts for policy reform (Birkland 2006).
These three temporal phases may overlap if time between
subsequent eruptions is short. Also, the shift from one state
to another is not necessarily demarcated by the volcanic
hazards themselves: there may still be low-impact hazards
occurring in in the post-crisis period; and changes in the
level of risk might also be caused by non-volcanic events
that alter the level of exposure or vulnerability to different
hazards. Nor do the phases identified above represent a
cycle in the social system (from stability-to crisis-returning
to a stable state). Indeed, the concept of a ‘disaster cycle’
has been heavily criticised by social scientists for represent-
ing disasters as temporary interruptions of a linear develop-
ment process and governance systems, after which society
returns to normal (Christoplos et al. 2001; Hewitt 1983;Twigg 2004). Governance systems do sometimes return to
pre-crisis states, demonstrating the stability or persistence
of institutions in the face of extreme social events
(Schreyögg and Sydow 2010). However, more often in
environmental and social systems, regime changes occur
following significant perturbations, whereby the system
moves to another stable state and sometimes this regime
shift is irreversible (Whitten et al. 2012). Similarly, for dis-
aster risk governance systems, we can expect disasters to
alter components of the system, at least temporarily –
whether perturbations are low-intensity but frequent or
singular, high-intensity events. Changes in the disaster risk
governance system during and following a protracted crisis
can therefore be characterised in terms of their stability,
from temporary alterations to permanent, irreversible
shifts.
Another aspect of the change process is the extent to
which the governance system is altered by the event –
whether it undergoes fundamental changes or not. Levels
of organisational change are described in the literature on
adaptation and resilience, where differences are drawn be-
tween single and double-loop (and sometimes even triple-
loop) learning; incremental and radical reform; transitions
and transformations (Pelling 2011). According to Mark
Pelling (2011: 74) transitions or incremental changes can
be seen when ‘the aims and practices of geographically or
sectorally-bound activities push but do not overturn estab-
lished political regimes’, while transformation ‘is an ex-
treme case where profound change alters the distribution
of rights and responsibilities and visions of development
across society’. Similarly, while single-loop learning de-
scribes the detection of an error and correction without
questioning the underlying values of the system, double-
loop learning occurs ‘when mismatches are corrected by
first examining and altering the governing variables and
then the actions’ (Argyris 1999: 68).
The nature of disaster risk governance shifts and change
processes described above can be summarised in a matrix
(see Table 1) and form the conceptual basis for analys-
ing institutional change in Montserrat. The unique co-
governance characteristics in Montserrat and other UK
overseas territories present a number of challenges to
studying institutional change of any sort. Institutions and
individuals interact in ways that are very different to other
governance settingsa, making generalisations or lesson
drawing about drivers of change particularly difficult.
However, in focussing on the dynamics of vertical go-
vernance, direct comparisons can be made to governance
arrangements in other contexts, including in federal gov-
ernance systems such as Mexico and India, decentralised
systems such as those found elsewhere in the Caribbean
and other multi-layered systems of governance, such as
the European Union. Conclusions are tentative and cau-
tion must be applied in making generalisations, but the
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governance transition that can occur following a volcanic
crisis.Methods
The analysis of vertical governance arrangements in
Montserrat presented below is based on qualitative pri-
mary data collected through a ‘forensic’ workshopb held in
September 2012 with 70 participants representing five
stakeholder groups: scientists, UK government officials,
Montserrat government officials (including disaster man-
agers), regional agency staff and community representa-
tives. The aim was to explore components of resilience
during and after the volcanic crisis as well as internal and
external factors that have undermined it. Moderated focus
group discussions on key events, tipping points and phases
of change were held and recorded. In addition, 16 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with local and UK
government officials and community leaders. Workshop
and interview recordings were transcribed and coded and
analysed using Atlas-ti software.
The coding categories were derived from the conceptual
framework to capture data on: (i) risk management pol-
icies and key decisions taken during different time periods
(before, during and after the crisis); (ii) roles and responsi-
bilities of different actors for DRM activities; (iv) relation-
ships between UK and local government authorities; and
(v) public perceptions of government decisions on risk
management policies (both UK and local). Interview and
focus group data was also coded for issues of (vi) risk
perception, (vii) trust and (viii) participation. Data was
triangulated across the five stakeholder groups and with
secondary literature, to help explain differences in judge-
ments about decisions taken by local and UK authorities.
Tensions arose as roles and responsibilities changed dur-
ing and after the crisis and these are highlighted, as are
the contrasting views of citizens and formal institutions
on levels of tolerable risk.It is important to point out that primary data was col-
lected from the focus group discussions and interviews to
supplement existing data and analysis of the Montserrat
crisis and recovery processes. This explains the very lim-
ited number of interviews. While this has its limitations,
the research team felt that governance during the crisis
and its immediate aftermath had already been studied in
depth, albeit from the perspective of science-policy inter-
face (see, for example, Donovan et al. 2012; Donovan and
Oppenheimer 2013). Further data was therefore collected
to complement this and bring it up to date, situating the
analysis of risk governance within broader decisions about
development and the future of the island.
Disaster risk governance in Montserrat – an unstable state
On the 18th July 1995, the Soufrière Hills Volcano became
active after a long period of dormancy. Approximately
6,000 people were evacuated from the capital Plymouth
and nearby towns to temporary shelters. They returned to
their homes, were evacuated again, and on 3rd April 1996
Plymouth was evacuated for the last time. Approximately
1,300 people were housed in temporary public shelters,
which suffered from overcrowding, lack of privacy, poor
sanitation and lack of access to good nutrition. Many
Montserratians left the island, supported by UK resettle-
ment packages, family and friends. By 2001, the popula-
tion of Montserrat had dropped by 60%, from 11,314 in
1991 to 4,491 in 2001 (CARICOM 2009). For those that
stayed, some were still in shelters three years after the
eruption. Those that decided to stay and resettle in the
north of the island, which is much drier and less fertile
than the south and more exposed to hurricanes and flood-
ing, faced severe challenges in re-establishing their liveli-
hoods (Rozdilsky 2001).
Re-settlement in the south meanwhile has been con-
trolled and in some areas prohibited. Exclusion zones
have been set up to control access to areas close to the
volcano according to the level of volcanic activity (see
Figure 2). These and other major risk management deci-
sions are listed in Annex 1. The governance arrange-
ments and relationships shaping these decisions and
collective responses to volcanic risk are discussed below.
Risk governance before the volcanic crisis
Governance arrangements in UK overseas territories are
unique because of their colonial history, although they
have some similarities to structures found in decentra-
lised systems of governance elsewhere. Local govern-
ments have autonomy over day-to-day decision-making
and planning with regard to social and economic policy,
receiving some budget support to do so, but defer to
central government over decisions regarding internal se-
curity and defence. This includes emergency manage-
ment functions, if the capacity of local government to
Figure 2 Map of exclusion zones, settlements in 2011 and pre-eruption settlements. Katy Mee, British Geological Survey.
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reduction decisions, local government is expected to
play a dominant role.
From 1961 up until the volcanic crisis, the local govern-
ment in Montserrat enjoyed very high levels of autonomy
from the UK. The 1960s saw a period of decolonisation in
the Caribbean and although Montserrat’s leaders chose to
remain part of Britain, the island became self-governing
with the formation of a locally elected ministerial govern-
ment. From then on, Montserrat, like the Turks and Caicos,
Cayman Islands and Anguilla, was treated as a quasi-
independent state. A new constitution in 1989 set the pa-
rameters for these governance arrangements, giving the
local government close to full autonomy over decision-
making within the territory. The governor of Montserrat,
a UK government representative and civil servant in the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was respon-
sible for defence, external affairs and internal security but
performed mainly ceremonial roles. The local government
meanwhile carried out most normal areas of government activ-
ity such as provision of health and education, policing and
land-use planning with relatively little interference fromthe UK government, requiring minimal budget support
and even developing some infrastructure projects inde-
pendently (Clay et al. 1999).
In terms of vertical coordination, a set of ‘ad-hoc’ and
‘personalised’ governance arrangements had evolved be-
tween the UK and its Caribbean Overseas Territories be-
fore the volcanic crisis. These reflected neither a sense of
shared sovereignty (as in the French Caribbean) nor nego-
tiated autonomy (as in the Dutch Caribbean), but rather
an assumption by the UK government that these terri-
tories would become independent (Hintjens and Hodge
2012: 202). Even the constitution created ambivalence,
recognising Montserrat’s separateness, but maintaining
the UK’s constitutional power to invoke emergency orders
and intervene directly in domestic affairs.
In-line with this broad level of independence before
the volcanic crisis, Montserrat was also free to design
and implement its own policies in response to perceived
disaster risks; however, limited local capacity to identify
and analyse risk was only part of the problem. Concen-
tration of political power within a few wealthy families,
party politicking and personalised politics, common to
Wilkinson Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:3 Page 7 of 15other island states (Skinner 2002) meant that policies
were geared towards favouring interest groups not serv-
ing the needs of the most vulnerable.
Like many of its Caribbean neighbours, Montserrat is
prone to a range of geological and hydro-meteorological
hazards and yet risk management knowledge was not well
developed and had not been incorporated into mainstream
development (World Bank 2002). Knowledge of volcanic
risk was extremely low amongst local politicians and UK
government representatives on island despite the publica-
tion of the Wadge and Isaacs report (1986), which had been
commissioned by the Pan Caribbean Disaster Prepared-
ness and Prevention Project (CDPPP). The report warned
of volcanic activity and the potential impact that an
eruption would have to the island’s capital, Plymouth. An
early version of the report was discussed with the
Permanent Secretary in the Chief Minister’s office, yet
there was no long-term planning for a volcanic eruption
(Shepherd et al. 2002). Many explanations have been offered
for this omission, including a lack of previous experience with
volcanic eruptions and the impenetrability of the scientific
language, both of which meant that it was difficult for
policy-makers to take the findings of the report seriously;
as well as limited resources and the more immediate focus
of dealing with hurricanes (interviews, local and UK
government officials, Montserrat, 2–4 October 2012).
In 1989, Hurricane Hugo hit the island leaving 11 dead
and over 3,000 homeless, as well as causing substantial
damage to approximately 85 per cent of homes and to a
number of the storm shelters (Berke and Wenger 1991). A
Hurricane Preparedness Scheme had been in place since
1980, but Hurricane Hugo revealed serious weaknesses
in planning, including poor emergency shelter construc-
tion and lack of maintenance. Moreover, the risk control
measures that were in place for this type of hazard,
including local development regulations and inspection
and enforcement procedures, had not been effectively im-
plemented, and the housing stock was not designed using
storm-resistant construction techniques. Unable to re-
spond to the crisis with local resources, a state of emer-
gency was declared and day-to-day control of the island
passed away from the locally-elected Chief Minister to the
FCO (Skinner 2006: 57). The UK government took over
emergency management efforts and the support was well
received (£3 m in emergency aid and £16 m in long-term
reconstruction) promoting a quick material recovery and
allowing Montserrat to achieve a budgetary surplus by
1995 (Clay et al. 1999).
Hurricane Hugo prompted a temporary alteration in
the prevailing governance arrangements, with the local
government losing decision-making autonomy and the
UK becoming directly involved in local affairs.
Montserrat is a contingent liability for the UK govern-
ment, so when local capacity to respond was surpassed,the UK recognised its responsibility to intervene and assist
the islanders (Hintjens and Hodge 2012). Lack of planning
and heavy dependency of foreign assistance led to a ‘loss
of control on the part of Montserrat authorities’ (Berke
and Wenger 1991: 77), but this was not permanent and
six months after the hurricane, Montserratian authorities
were exerting substantial control over the recovery process
and development plans.
Abrupt social events allow hitherto marginalised issues
to get on the agenda, by opening up ‘policy windows’
and creating spaces for policy reform (Kingdon 1995). In
the same way, major disasters can act as ‘focusing
events’ by bringing the failures of existing disaster pol-
icies to the attention of the public and policy makers,
opening up policy windows for DRM reform (Birkland
2006). Hurricane Hugo made it clear to local authorities
that a more coordinated effort was needed to prepare
for and respond to extreme events and in 1994 a Na-
tional Disaster Action Plan was drawn up and an Emer-
gency Operations Centre (EOC) established in 1995.
However, for the reasons described above a volcanic
eruption was not on the political radar either for inclu-
sion in the plan or reconstruction efforts after Hurricane
Hugo. Indeed, the £16 million investment in recon-
structing Plymouth, building a new hospital and hous-
ing, would have acted as a major disincentive to
investing elsewhere even if volcanic risk had been taken
seriously. As such, reducing risk to hurricanes in the
post-disaster reconstruction efforts locked Montserrat in
to high exposure to volcanic risk and a development tra-
jectory that would prove difficult to alter in the face of
an abrupt change in the volcanic hazard.
Prior to the volcanic crisis Monserrat was poorly inte-
grated in regional and international risk governance sys-
tems. There was no formal mechanism through which
Montserratian authorities could access resources or advice
on disaster scenarios, potential impact and risk reduction
options, although in fairness the international community
as a whole understood little about the social or political
sources of disaster risk in 1995. International and regional or-
ganisations at that time were promoting scientific, engin-
eering and bureaucratic (or ‘technocratic’) solutions
to disaster problems (Hewitt 1995; Cannon 1994). The
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA),
set up in under the Caribbean Community and Common
Market (CARICOM) in 1991, was, as its name suggests, a
response-focussed agency with objectives of coordinating
relief efforts, channelling aid from NGOs and other gov-
ernments, mitigating the immediate consequences of dis-
aster and improving disaster response capacity amongst
participating states. As such, it provided little guidance as
to how to assess and manage risk. Montserrat could not
expect much in the way of technical support or guidance
from the UK government either, as it did not have a DRM
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was not brought into force until November 2005. Overall,
the lack of coherence across knowledge systems, resulted
in a limited consideration of any hazards in development
policies and plans. In particular, it made Montserrat highly
susceptible to the unknown risks associated with the Sou-
frière Hills volcano.
During the crisis
Emergency management during the crisis has been charac-
terised as unplanned, reactive and short term (Clay et al.
1999). Lack of preparedness meant that ‘actions taken by
the UK Government and the Government of Montserrat
were driven stepwise by events in the volcanic escalation’
(Kokelaar 2002: 1). Unlike Hurricane Hugo, where
Montserrat’s independence from the UK remained largely
unaltered despite huge investments in reconstruction, the
volcanic crisis brought about an abrupt realignment of
vertical governance arrangements, with the UK govern-
ment’s position towards this overseas territory shifting
radically towards greater intervention as the crisis un-
folded. Even as Montserrat moves beyond recovery into
processes of longer-term development, central-local rela-
tions have not returned to their pre-eruption state.
The EOC was the key local government entity man-
aging the response to the volcanic eruption (Clay et al.
1999). Though a nominally ‘local’ institution led by the
chief minister’s office, the EOC is activated by the gov-
ernor who on 3 April 1996 declared a state of emer-
gency, thus rendering the EOC subservient to the
governor’s office and ultimately the FCO. At the begin-
ning of the crisis the EOC made some decisions about
planning and coordination of evacuations, supplies and
shelters; but once the state of emergency was declared it
no longer made any substantive decisions without the
governor’s consent. In small face-to-face societies ‘people
take on a number of roles and might interact with each
other in different capacities at different times of the day
[and] [t]his can make communication very difficult’
(Skinner 2002: 307). During the crisis these norms of
communication were suddenly altered by changes in the
already complex functions of different actors, often cre-
ating tension – for example between the chief minister
and the governor.
In addition to this shift in decision-making authority,
the capacity of the EOC to make decisions regarding
emergency response was tested and found wanting, as
decisions during the crisis became more complex. In
shelter management, for example, the EOC had no spe-
cial expertise or sensitivity to the importance of en-
gaging people in decisions (Clay et al. 1999: 70).
Moreover, as people (and particularly the middle class)
began to leave the island as the crisis intensified, local
management capacity was further eroded.The volcanic crisis was marked by a lack of contin-
gency planning or strategy for how the FCO and the
then the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) would
manage a complex and long duration emergency in an
overseas territory: ‘Ad-hoc arrangements had to be put
in place and this was done reactively as the eruption
progressed’ (Clay et al. 1999). The strategy adopted was
to react to changing hazard levels as they were identified
but this lack of planning, coupled with low levels of
communication and community consultation, meant
that UK and ‘local’ ideas about how to manage emer-
gency response often diverged.
Weaknesses in planning were also partly due to poor
horizontal coordination between the FCO, which dele-
gated advice on external affairs, civil order and financial
matters to the Dependent Territories Regional Secretariat
(DTRS) in Barbados, set up in 1993, and ODA. Each had
responsibilities and roles to play in an emergency situation
but there were some unclear areas of responsibility within
this complex set of horizontal institutional arrangements,
resulting in a fragmentation in authority (Clay et al. 1999:
16). Prior to the crisis, Montserratian authorities had be-
come accustomed to dealing only with the DTRS but as
the crisis evolved, other departments and individuals
would become more directly involved in emergency aid,
splitting the decision-making responsibility and resources
across branches of government. This ‘bizarre situation’ , as
it was referred to by journalist Polly Pattullo (2000: 137),
was compounded by insufficient mechanisms for inter-
departmental coordination of responsibilities in London
(Clay et al. 1999: 16). In addition, aid coordination was
complicated by donations coming in from a range of
sources including bilateral aid from CARICOM countries,
regional/multilateral aid from the Caribbean Development
Bank (CDB), the European Commission Humanitarian
Office (ECHO), and from NGOs. Montserrat was not
short of emergency relief, according to local residents, but
there were not enough trained people to handle it and
this, along with delays at customs because packages were
not properly labelled, slowed down the process (focus
group discussions, 27 September 2012).
Trust between the state and society can be caused and
aggravated by low levels of formal public consultation on –
as well as public willingness to participate in - decisions
regarding emergency management (Wilkinson 2012). The
emergency aid programme in Montserrat was imple-
mented with little local consultation creating tensions be-
tween UK and local authorities, a deepening sense of
insecurity amongst residents and growing mistrust be-
tween local stakeholders and UK government. As tents,
cots and army rations were distributed, the inappropriate-
ness of many of the supplies became apparent (interviews
and focus groups, various, 28 September - 3 October
2013). Examples included bringing in pit latrines, which
Wilkinson Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:3 Page 9 of 15had never before been used on the island, and tents to be
used as shelters, which would not withstand tropical storms
and were inappropriate for the heat; all of which could have
been avoided by consulting local authorities. Conversely, al-
though citizens were able to express their views on both
local and UK government handling of affairs through radio
programmes, they were reluctant to go to town meetings.
Hence, formal channels of social participation in decisions-
making were very limited (interviews, local government of-
ficials and residents, 1 and 3 October 2012).
Lack of coherence between local and UK authorities
over policy direction also contributed to growing mistrust.
The local government preferred a ‘wait and see’ approach
during the early phases of the emergency, assuming less
serious impacts from the eruption, which resulted in de-
ferral of UK-funded public housing construction in the
north. The UK government, on the other hand, preferred
to plan for the worst case, because of its ultimate responsi-
bility for Montserrat (Clay et al., 1999: 54). This included
drawing up a plan for the complete evacuation of the is-
land, known as Operation Exodus. Operation Exodus had
existed since the early days, but did not become public
knowledge until May 1998, which generated rumours of
‘relocation schemes’ and plans by the UK government to
‘de-populate the island’ (interviews, local residents, 3
October 2012). The UK government was unlikely to have
had any genuine desire to empty the island but the lack of
a public communications strategy on shelters, evacuations
and recovery plans had negative repercussions with
Montserratians commonly expressing the view that ‘the
UK Government wanted us off the island’ (interview, local
resident, 3 October 2012).
Coherence in emergency management was complicated
by the various vertical lines of communication that existed
between different UK departments and local authorities
and between the scientists on and off the island and UK
and local authorities. In particular, the volcanic crisis
highlighted the lack of local capacity to translate and com-
municate scientific information and this had repercussions
for awareness of risk amongst local government officials
and the public:
There was not a systematic analysis of scientific advice
and policy-makers did not know what questions to ask…
The Wadge Report was a perfect example of that: no
one took any notice because it was not translated into
practical advice (interview, UK government official, 2
October 2012).
From a local government perspective, clearer messages
were needed and expected to help interpret volcanic
hazard information, as one local government official ex-
plained (interview, local government official, 4 October
2012):We had little experience with scientists. With
hurricanes they are more hands off; they can show you
on a computer and it is easier to understand. With a
volcano it is difficult to see anything on which to base
a decision, plus the scientists kept saying ‘this is not an
exact science’. In an effort to be cautious they actually
reduced their own credibility and the public started to
doubt.
The failure to articulate and coordinate policy direc-
tion also delayed reconstruction efforts and crucially, the
decision to invest in the north and hence drastically re-
duce levels of volcanic risk on the island. The UK had
put money into rebuilding Plymouth and continued to
see it as the island’s capital, and for this reason the
Department for International Development (DFID) was
reluctant to start buying up land in the north and build-
ing houses there (Clay et al. 1999). More broadly, the
UK government was waiting for the volcano to stabilise
before re-investing in the island’s infrastructure, and at
the same time, Montserratian authorities wanted to
avoid sending out the wrong signals and were keen to
maintain a ‘business as usual’ atmosphere to keep people
on the island and keep the economy going (Skinner
2002). This may explain why it did not put more pres-
sure on the UK government or ask for money to start
building in the north; but the result was that two years
after destruction of Plymouth, over 300 people were still
living in temporary shelters (Haynes et al. 2008; Skelton
2003).
Despite complex organisational structures and unclear
mandates, coordination of emergency management did
improve as the crisis progressed. The administration of
shelters improved for example when the UK government
responded to complaints about aid in 1996 by introducing
a food voucher scheme. In 1997, the vouchers were re-
placed by cheques as a pragmatic response to pressure for
more flexibility, so people could use the income to pay
other expenses such as rent (focus groups, various, 28
September - 3 October 2013). This also reduced the heavy
administrative burden of the voucher scheme (Clay et al.
1999).
After the volcanic crisis
It is difficult to identify the exact point at which emer-
gency management ended and longer-term recovery plan-
ning began, as recovery has not been a geographically
evenly distributed phenomenon, with ‘different areas of
the island… in different stages of the recovery process’
(Rozdilsky 1999: 6). Similarly, it is hard to identify the time
when the people of Montserrat accepted and began to
plan for a new future in the north of the island. Certainly,
the 19 deaths on 25 June 1997 were ‘a game changer’
(interview, UK government official, 2 October 2012).
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Montserrat received from the UK. From late 1997 on-
wards, emergency aid was increasingly outweighed by
budget support and substantial capital investments to
re-establish basic services, develop infrastructure and
provide incentives and an enabling environment for pri-
vate investment and longer-term development. From
1997 to 2012, DFID spent £325 million on technical as-
sistance, budgetary support and capital investments,
representing 50 per cent of the total spent on Overseas
Territories during that period. Six capital investment
projects alone (an airport, roads, water, power and edu-
cation) involved an investment of over £34 million (ICAI
2013). However, the scale of this investment came at the
price of heavy reliance on the UK, and although the
local government is keen to avoid long-term dependency
and achieve self-sufficiency but there is no realistic plan
for doing so. The 2011 Strategic Growth Plan, for ex-
ample, creates ‘no overall picture of self-sufficiency for
the island’ (ICAI 2013: 8). A reliance on the UK for
capital is compounded by the fact that Montserrat
cannot access development finance from other sources.
It is not eligible for loans from the World Bank or
International Monetary Fund, although it receives some
funds from the EU and CDB - £4.8 million from 2012 to
2015, but this merely supplements the £24 million com-
mitted by DFID for the same period (ICAI 2013).
A change of government in the UK in May 1997 had
far-reaching consequences for risk management in
Montserrat, with the UK government at senior level tak-
ing more of an interest. The Montserrat Action Group
was formed and the then Secretary of State for Inter-
national Development Claire Short established a joint
DFID-FCO review of off- and on-island options, and
£6.5 m was allocated by the UK government for develop-
ment in the north. Coordination of recovery efforts im-
proved thanks to a clarification of mandates in London
within one department - the Conflict and Humanitarian
Affairs Department of DFID – which was made respon-
sible for coordination of all financial aid and equipment
to Montserrat. However, this had the impact of separat-
ing UK development and foreign policy, with Montser-
rat’s governor reporting to the FCO and the Aid Office
reporting to DFID, essentially separating safety from
funding.
Despite its financial dependency on the UK, improve-
ments in DRM policy and organisational structures
owe more to Montserrat’s insertion in the regional
disaster risk governance system. The new unit in
government in 1997, now called the Disaster Risk Man-
agement Coordination Agency (DMCA), set up to
coordinate DRM activities, and the Disaster Prepared-
ness and Response Act of 1999, were based more on ex-
amples from around the Caribbean than the UK disastermanagement system. CDERA (which later became the Carib-
bean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) in
2009) adopted a comprehensive disaster management
approach and national emergency management offices
across the Caribbean have followed suit. These strategies
also reflect the language and priority areas of the Hyogo
Framework for Action 2005–2015; demonstrating the in-
fluence that international policy has had on regional risk
management.
Integration in the regional risk governance system deep-
ened in 1999, when the Montserrat Volcano Observatory
Act was passed, bringing it under local legislation and
encouraging ‘collaborative links with regional and extra-
regional centres of expertise in scientific disciplines rele-
vant to monitoring volcanic activity’ (1999, Art.8). It was
now seen as a locally owned institution (interview, UK
government official, 2 October 2012). Montserrat also
began to receive advice and support from CDEMA, as one
of 18 participating states and was included in the Action
Plan 2011–2012 for the Caribbean, promoted by the disas-
ter preparedness programme of the European Commis-
sion's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Directorate
General (DIPECHO). Montserrat’s Sustainable Develop-
ment Plan 2008–2020 now reflects a comprehensive disas-
ter management mentality, with a Strategic Goal on
environmental management and disaster mitigation that
emphasises governance structures, training and education
on DRM and building response capacity at all levels.
Even more encouragingly DRM is now seen to be an in-
tegral part of the development process, at least on paper.
Local government authorities recognise that disasters can
lead to major disruptions to the island’s developmental
agenda (Government of Montserrat 2005). The Montserrat
Corporate Plan 2003–2006, health, water and education
sector plans all included DRM elements, although these
mainly focussed on streamlining disaster preparedness and
response. In 2003, for example, the Ash Clearing Assist-
ance Project concentrated on reducing air pollution and
health hazards in the environment after the volcano dome
collapse. Local ownership over emergency response was
clearly demonstrated at this time: the Montserrat govern-
ment declared the disaster and activated the emergency
operations centre, which then acted as the coordination
body for response and relief efforts.
Notwithstanding these improvements however, decision-
making authority on island and the coordination of DRM
activities is still limited by the absence of an inclusive
DRM plan. As of October 2012, the Disaster Management
Plan was still not finalised and had only been updated in
an ad-hoc manner by the DMCA director. Hence the con-
tent of the plan and allocation of responsibilities remains
unclear to other government officials (interviews, local
government officials, 3–4 October 2012). The DMCA is
an operational not regulatory agency with a mandate to
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ety and so can only play a limited role in strengthening
local DRM capacity on-island. As one local government
official commented:
Institutions are stronger, but high staff turnover and
lack of technical experience mean that an effective
disaster response in the future will require quick
funding and external support. The Government of
Montserrat will be able to respond in a limited way
for a week or two but will need financial support and
technical assistance (interview, local government
official, 3 October 2012).
By the end of 1997 the north was deemed safe for
occupation but people were still living in shelters. A
Sustainable Development Plan was produced identifying
health, education and housing investments needed for
economic and social recovery, but many of these invest-
ments were undertaken with only a short-term focus:
the hospital was upgraded at the St John’s site, not re-
built; an emergency jetty was built at Little Bay instead
of a harbour; and only a temporary government headquar-
ters were set up in Brades (Sword-Daniels et al. 2013). For
many, it was not until 1999 that the emergency phase
really ended. Eruptive activity continued, but a new gov-
ernance regime was beginning to emerge with a vision
of the island’s future development. This ‘co-governance’
regime would continue to dominate central-local rela-
tions in Montserrat to the present day. The local
government began to take the lead on day-to-day man-
agement functions, such as the procurement and man-
agement of development projects and some control
over spending decisions, but with strong oversight and
financial control from the UK. Montserrat regained
some autonomy with respect to the crisis period, but
compared with the pre-crisis situation, economic de-
pendency remained high:
DFID keep changing the rules of the game, including
greater scrutiny of expenditures, increasing limits to what
officers can approve now (compared to 1995). All this
affects our ability to respond quickly to people’s needs
(interview, UK government official, 3 October 2012).
Greater coherence between UK and local risk percep-
tions and DRM activities can be observed from 2001 on-
wards with the development of a strategy to sustain the
on-island community and promote long-term investment
in the north of the island (Clay et al. 1999: 13). By restrict-
ing access to proximal areas (the boundaries of which have
changed over time (Aspinall et al. 2002)) and investing in
basic and road infrastructure, housing and services in the
north, levels of exposure to pyroclastic flows and laharshave all been dramatically reduced (Sword-Daniels et al.
2013). For the Montserrat Government these decisions
marked an important turning point in the recovery
process:
In 2001 the economy began to recover and economic
plans were made, based on scientific advice. The
Scientists said that the far north was of low negligible
risk. Once that was said they set the foundations for
serious thinking about investment for those who
stayed. They realised it would have to be in the north
(interview, local government official, 3 October 2012).
There was no formal public consultation process to
establish how different actors viewed volcanic risk on
the island (Haynes et al. 2008), however, perceptions of
risk appear to have been broadly aligned at this point
with residents beginning to consider the north their
permanent home (interviews, local residents, 1–3 Octo-
ber 2012). Many had already left the island after by the
Boxing Day collapse in 1997 and facilitated by reloca-
tion packages offered in 1998, but even for those that
stayed and had lost their houses, land and jobs, the
north did not represent an ‘acceptable option’ in terms
of levels of risk and livelihood options until housing re-
construction began (interview, UK government official,
2 October 2012). This perception of the south being
dangerous (approximately 60 percent of the island) and
the north being safe for habitation was broadly in line
with the scientific assessments, through which areas
were established as exclusion zones – some perman-
ently, and others in accordance with the level of vol-
canic activity. Despite informal reports of people
entering the permanent exclusion area (Zone V) with-
out permission, the current general perception amongst
islanders is that this area will continue to be highly
exposed to volcanic hazards and they will never be
able to return (interviews and focus groups, various,
28 September - 3 October 2013).
In the transition from recovery to longer-term develop-
ment, greater vertical coherence in development planning
has emerged. This owes much to harmonisation across de-
partments in the UK, with ODA being upgraded to minis-
try status and re-named DFID, with overall responsibility
for the aid budget. A team of programme officers for
Montserrat was created within DFID and on island (a resi-
dent lead, an infrastructure adviser and two programme of-
ficers) (ICAI 2013). Forced on to the political agenda in the
UK by the volcanic crisis, these changes –outlined in the
1999 White Paper Partnership for Progress and Prosperity
and 2002 British Overseas Territories Act– have had
important implications for inter-governmental mandates:
any laws adopted by the UK or through the European
Union, are now applicable to Montserrat. This includes
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brought about increased consultation between political
cadres of territories and the UK government, and a more
proactive dialogue has opened up (interviews, UK and local
government officials, 1–2 October 2012).
The volcanic crisis had uncovered some of the inher-
ent contradictions in the autonomous system of govern-
ance in Montserrat, but it also prompted UK and local
authorities to consider their own levels of risk tolerance
and responsibilities for reducing exposure. A tacit align-
ment of UK and local government risk perceptions was
established in 1999 and endorsed through the definition
of an exclusion zone and subsequent investment in the
north. Yet more recent studies suggest that these formal
notions of tolerable risk may not be shared by the local
population or even the local government (Haynes et al.
2008). Exposure to high-impact events such as pyroclas-
tic flows has been dramatically reduced through officially
prescribed norms intended to reduce risk (relocation
and establishing exclusion zones), but the north of the
island had been affected by ash fall and acid rain until
recenly, representing a low-level, intermittent but wide-
spread risk that is given low consideration in develop-
ment planning. Ash fall presents health risks and asthma
sufferers in particular have reported suffering respiratory
problems from heavy ash fall (interviews, local residents,
1 to 3 October 2012). Infrastructure built during the re-
covery period has also been affected and needs constant
cleaning, replacement and repair. Most buildings (and
homes) have tropical slatted windows, which allow ash to
enter buildings because they cannot be properly sealed
(Sword-Daniels et al., 2013).
The negative impacts of relocating people in the north
of the island and of the social upheaval of Montserratians
moving to the UK should not be overlooked. Most
Montserratians on the island today, are worse off econom-
ically that before the eruption. Farming activities are less
lucrative and farmers are reluctant to invest as they do not
have security of tenure and are aware of the threat of
future ash fall and acid rain (Halcrow Group and the
Montserrat National Assessment Team 2012). Land short-
ages in the north have meant that new houses have been
erected in unsafe and unsuitable locations such as ravines
(Hicks and Few, 2014). Although resettlement has reduced
exposure to volcanic hazards, these policies have created
new vulnerabilities for the island population that may be
more tolerable than volcanic hazard exposure for now, but
this may not always be the case.
There are instances of individuals not subscribing to of-
ficial rules, which suggests that levels of risk tolerance vary
and are not static. People entering the exclusion zone for
livelihood reasons, such as tending to crops and illegal
scrap metal collecting, as well as those building too close
to the exclusion zone, are examples of this. Expatriateresidents continue to live in Old Towne, which can be-
come part of the exclusion zone with heightened volcanic
activity, and have expressed their reluctance to evacuate
and lack of confidence in the alert levels issued by the
MVO and temporary evacuations decisions (interviews,
local residents, 3 October 2012). Nearby Salem has a sec-
ondary school and a primary healthcare clinic and is home
to a growing immigrant population and an ad-hoc busi-
ness district (Sword-Daniels et al. 2013). Rental housing is
cheaper in this area and new arrivals appear to be less
aware of the risks associated with volcanic activity than
Montserratians (interviews, local residents and local gov-
ernment, 1 to 3 October 2012). Overall, the view that the
future of the island is in the north appears not be as
unanimous as official views and recent patterns of infra-
structure investments suggest.
Another factor suggesting that local authorities may
not entirely endorse the idea of development in the
north is the temporary nature of much of the island’s
vital infrastructure. Sword-Daniels et al. (2013) note that
many of the buildings and essential services that were
put up during the recovery period were not permanent
structures. These facilities have been upgraded incre-
mentally over time but the perception of sites as tempor-
ary has in some cases obstructed funding leaving some
buildings in an inadequate state. These ‘quick fixes’ need
to be re-addressed to enable further progress towards
development goals.
Discussion
The disaster risk governance regime in Montserrat has
undergone a radical shift as a result of the volcanic crisis
of 1995–1997 and alterations in central and local per-
ceptions of volcanic risk. Essentially, a longer-term view
of risk has been adopted by UK and local authorities,
scientists and local communities, and this has brought
with it substantial investments in safer locations further
north and a belief that the future of the island is in the
north. DRM in Montserrat is no longer concerned with
the circumstances under which a return to south will be
possible or how to make lives and livelihoods safer in
former settlements. The longer term view of risk manage-
ment being taken and new investments being made in
safer locations further from the volcano, represents an
important shift in the risk governance system (see Table 2).
A transformation towards greater vertical coherence
has also taken place but is not complete, and there are
signs that local and external-scientific assessments of
volcanic risk in Montserrat are diverging. In particular,
scientists and UK government officials have raised con-
cerns about increasing settlement in areas close to the
exclusion zone plus the low consideration given to ash
fall in development planning (interviews, UK govern-
ment officials and scientists, Montserrat, 2–4 October
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that the tolerable level of risk for local residents is higher
in some cases than that established by UK and Montser-
ratian authorities. Similarly, international development
agencies have expressed concern that public awareness
of hazards other than volcanoes needs to be improved.
According to a review of disaster risk management
capacity in Montserrat carried out by UNDP (2010), the
focus of DRM activities is too often related to the
Soufrière Hills volcano, with insufficient emphasis on a
multi-hazard approach.
These local perceptions of risk and the cognitive
processes through which risks are deemed insignificant
or adequately controlled by individuals and groups need
to be explored further and contrasted with external and
scientific judgements. Calculations of tolerable risk are
not static and the analysis presented above demonstrates
how both new people coming into a volcanic area and
the passing of time may change ‘local’ perceptions of
risk. The Montserrat case does however suggest that
transformational shifts in disaster risk governance can
only occur when tolerable levels of risk are agreed on by
stakeholders and this will require high levels of horizon-
tal as well as vertical and coherence.
In analysing continuities and discontinuities in Montserrat’s
disaster risk governance system from the late 1980s to the
present day, alterations in the governance system can be
observed on two occasions: in the aftermath of Hurricane
Hugo and during the volcanic crisis period. For both
events, abrupt changes in levels of disaster risk and limited
local capacity to respond led to greater external interference
in local DRM decisions. Although Hurricane Hugo was a
high impact event, the hazard subsided quickly and these
alterations were temporary. The volcanic eruption, on the
other hand, occurred over a long period of time and pro-
duced more permanent changes in the disaster risk govern-
ance regime and in the island’s governance system moreTable 2 Nature and processes of disaster risk governance in M
Change in disaster
risk governance system
Phases of volcanic risk
Pre-crisis Du
Nature of change (a) Dispersion of
decision-making













Change process (a) Stability (a) Temporary shift to high




(b) Extent (b) Little change. (b)
relbroadly. The sharp and sustained rise in the level of vol-
canic risk combined with a weak response from local and
UK authorities led to a sustained reduction in local auton-
omy but also an increase in vertical coherence and when
levels of risk declined and post-disaster recovery ended
these new configurations did not return to their pre-crisis
state.
This transformation may not prove to be irreversible,
although there could be a latent ‘tendency towards
dependency’ in Montserrat common to all UK overseas
territories (Pattullo 2000; Skinner 2002). For critics of
UK colonialism these territories ‘will always struggle to
develop and will always be dependent upon other places
and people’ (Skinner 2002: 316). One aspect of the shift
in risk governance in particular that may be permanent
is that of increased vertical coherence. Although local
capacity to assess risk and implement risk reduction
measures is still limited by lack of human and technical
resources, Montserrat is now better integrated into a
regional disaster risk governance system that can offer
this support and advice. This is unlikely to change.Conclusions
This research draws a number of conclusions about vol-
canic crises and regime change in Montserrat of rele-
vance to multi-tiered governance regimes elsewhere
and to different hazardous contexts. The examples of
Hurricane Hugo and Soufrière Hills both suggest that cri-
ses brought about by sharp increases in the level of risk
are likely to provoke temporary alterations in central-local
relations, and in particular a sharp decline in local auton-
omy over DRM decisions. This intervention by external
actors can have both negative and positive consequences
for disaster risk management, creating dependency but
also enhancing vertical coherence, offering opportunities
for learning and capacity building.ontserrat
ring crisis Post-crisis
Scaling-up of UK intervention
response to weak local capacity.
(a) New co-governance regime with
low levels of local autonomy.
Problems with policy coherence
ating confusion over policy aims,
k of confidence in government
d mistrust.
(b) Greater vertical coherence on
DRM – e.g. linking up with other
scales (regional and EU).
Temporary shift to high levels of
ternal control.
(a) Sustained shift to high levels of
external control. Irreversible shift to
greater vertical coherence.
Incremental change to vertical
ations during crisis.
(b) Transformation in decision-making
control. Incomplete transformation in
vertical coherence.
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tion should be exercised in drawing lessons for other con-
texts. In particular, the relationship between the UK and its
overseas territories is unique and different even from French
and Dutch overseas territories in the Caribbean. Central gov-
ernments elsewhere may not be so inclined to provide
ongoing financial support to local governments after the re-
covery process is considered to have ended. Similarly, local
governments with significant levels of autonomy in decentra-
lised and particularly federal systems of governance else-
where are likely to reject sustained central government
interference in local affairs following a protracted crisis. Gov-
ernance reform in Montserrat was the product of conflict,
but ultimately compromise, and in other contexts consensus
between central and local authorities on tolerable levels of
risk may be harder to achieve. Notwithstanding these
caveats, however, the transition to co-governance and the re-
framing of disaster risk that have taken place in Montserrat
provide useful examples of how transformations can occur
in disaster risk governance systems following high-intensity,
long-duration volcanic events.
The experience of Montserrat also provides useful in-
sights for volcanic islands elsewhere and small island
states with disaster risks more generally. Small islands
have few options for resettlement when significant parts
of the territory are destroyed by a disaster, or when the
decision is taken to move populations before a disaster
to prevent loss of life. The benefits in terms of reducing
disaster risk have to be weighed against loss of liveli-
hoods for a significant proportion of the population,
considerable social upheaval and often economic decline.
Critical to the success and sustainability of these risk
management decisions is the need for vertical coherence
and dialogue between different scales of governance. In
Montserrat this has been partly achieved through greater
integration into the regional risk governance system and
via the establishment of an economically dependent but
politically autonomous system of co-governance with
the UK. But unless communities are also engaged in risk
governance decisions and consensus is built, this tacit
agreement to pursue a low-volcanic-risk development
model could come unstuck. Small islands with large
risks can learn from the Montserrat experience. They
can anticipate and plan for how these dialogues might
take place in the event of a major disaster.
Endnotes
aFor a more detailed discussion of complex social rela-
tions and personal politics of small societies as well as
the dependency mentality of overseas territories ad
former colonies see Skinner (2002).
bThe Montserrat workshop was run by the STREVA
programme as part of a ‘forensic’ research process, from
25-29th September 2012.Additional file
Additional file 1: A summarised chronology of events and
decisions related to disaster risk governance.
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